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iABSTRACT
It is widely assumed that the managers of companies behave in a self-interested and
opportunistic manner when making the discretionary accounting choices that are applied in
the preparation of published financial reports.  Empirical research has found evidence for this
in the United States, Britain, Spain, France and Australia, amongst other countries.  There has,
however, been no prior work of a similar nature in a South African context.
The purpose of this study is to extend this body of work by examining the relationship between
a number of potentially opportunistic (profit-increasing, income-smoothing and solvency-
improving) accounting choices made by the managers of South African listed companies, and
growth rates in the share prices of those companies.
Data in respect of thirty-nine medium-sized South African listed companies are analysed for
evidence of the expected positive relationship between opportunistic accounting choices and
share price growth.  No evidence is found for this relationship.  This may be due to limitations
in the research design, inadequacies in the interpretation of the agency theory from which the
hypotheses are developed, or a combination of both.  Refinements in the research design or
a re-interpretation of the theory may be successful in addressing these matters as part of future
research efforts.
Key words: accounting choice, managerial opportunism.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research context
During its financial year ended 31 March 2008, British Airways plc increased the
depreciation period for its RB211 engines (used in 747 and 767 aircraft) from 54 months
to 78 months.  This reduced its depreciation expense for the year by £32,5 million
(British Airways, 2008: 100).  
The effect on the company’s consolidated income statement was considerable (a 3,8%
improvement in profit before tax, to £883 million).  Another significant effect of the
depreciation change was the subject of critical commentary on the Financial Times
website:
… business has been in dire straits for some time now. The
much-lauded 10 per cent operating profit margin—barely
achieved last fiscal-year [ended March 2008] and used as a
benchmark to restart dividend payments—was helped along by a
clever accounting trick, not a genuine improvement in business
levels.
The airline changed the depreciation period for their RB211
engines, generating a £32.5m decrease in annual depreciation
charges, et voila, CEO Willie Walsh gets his 10 per cent margin
despite the fiasco that was Terminal 5's opening and rising fuel
costs (Financial Times, 2008).
The cynicism of the Financial Times report reflects a widespread belief that company
managers behave in a self-interested and opportunistic fashion.  This belief has persisted
for many years.  It certainly predates, and is independent of, the global financial crisis that
2began manifesting its full extent in 2008.  For example, in a prescient speech delivered
before a different financial disaster materialised (this time, the bursting of the “dot com”
bubble in 2001), the then chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
United States used some strong language, referring to “corporate managers [who] are
participants in a game of nods and winks”, the fact that “accounting is being perverted”
and that “earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying
financial performance of the company” (Levitt, 1998).
It is sometimes startling to observe the longevity of the belief that accounting is nothing
much more than a convenient instrument of misrepresentation, to be used at will by
unscrupulous managers.  The following newspaper editorial, for example, could have
been referring to the recent actions of British Airways management, except that it was
written more than thirty years earlier:
A lot of executives apparently believe that if they can figure out
a way to boost reported earnings their stock price will go up even
if the higher earnings do not represent any underlying economic
change.  In other words, the executives think they are smart and
the market is dumb (The Wall Street Journal, 1 October 1974, in
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 75).   
 A final example comes from Paton and Littleton’s book on corporate accounting, viewed
by many as an important early foundation for modern accounting practice.  They refer to
a concern arising from the separation of ownership and management in companies: “the
interests of various classes of investors may not receive the balanced consideration they
deserve.  In particular cases there may be a strong urge to increase immediate profits in
any possible manner” (Paton and Littleton, 1940: 1).
The “clever accounting trick”, “game of nods and winks” and allegations that managers’
actions are based on the belief that “the market is dumb” (Paton and Littleton are more
polite) would not have been possible if the managers of companies did not have a degree
3of freedom in the way they calculate profits.   Putting this another way, implicit in the
belief that accounting can be used to misrepresent an underlying economic reality is the
understanding that managers are able to make choices in accounting for their companies’
various transactions, events and circumstances.  
One example of such a choice is referred to in the Financial Times commentary: British
Airways management were able and willing to alter the useful lives of certain assets.
(They were able in the sense that accounting rules did not prevent them from doing so,
and willing in the sense that, for whatever motivation, they wished to do so.)  The lines
of causality arising from this management decision are interesting to consider.  The
accounting change could certainly have no effect on the economic reality of the expected
lifespan of aircraft engines.  As for the reverse causality, the company’s financial report
makes no mention of a technological discovery about the engines, or a changed
maintenance process affecting them, that would justify the change in accounting for them.
In the absence of direct and clear logical links between the engines and the way in which
they are accounted for, it is hardly surprising that the effect of the accounting change on
a relatively unrelated headline accounting figure (profit for the year) stands out very
clearly indeed in the eyes of commentators, cynical or otherwise.
The accounting choices made by the managers of companies have attracted the close
attention of accounting researchers for many years.  A key early intellectual antecedent
for modern research on this topic is Gordon’s (1964) paper, which argues that a
company’s management will “within the limits of its power, i.e., the latitude allowed by
accounting rules, smooth reported income” (Gordon, 1964: 262).  This hypothesis was
based on the assumptions that (1) managers make those accounting choices that will
maximise their own utility, (2) management utility increases with job security and level
of income, (3) the job security and high income goals are in turn dependent on
shareholder satisfaction, and (4) the satisfaction of shareholders increases with the rate
of return on their capital, and the stability of the company’s income.
By the late 1970s, Gordon’s smoothing hypothesis remained essentially unconfirmed.
4Problems in the specification of subsequent empirical tests may have contributed to this,
but Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest that, in addition, “certain aspects of the
Gordon model contribute to the model’s lack of confirmation” (Watts and Zimmerman,
1978: 114).  
In 1979, Watts and Zimmerman proposed an alternative model, grounded in agency
theory, in which the company manager is an agent, and the shareholder and bondholder
are principals.  There are a number of reasons that the agent’s interests do not necessarily
coincide with those of the principals, including the manager’s “incentives to transfer
wealth to himself at the expense of both the shareholders and bondholders” (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979: 276).  One way in which managers seek to achieve such wealth
transfers is through profit manipulation, and profit manipulation is, in turn, achievable
by means of exercising whatever accounting choices are available.  Watts and
Zimmerman conclude their analysis in dramatic fashion: “the only accounting theory that
will provide a set of predictions that are consistent with observed phenomena is one
based on self-interest” (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979: 301).
There has been a very rich vein of subsequent related research, that continues to this day.
Most of this work has been concentrated in the United States (see, for example, Pincus
and Wasley (1994), Balsam (1998), Heflin, Kwon and Wild (2002), Beatty and Weber
(2006) and Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer and Khanin (2008)).  However, researchers have
also studied opportunistic accounting choices by managers in Europe (for example,
Switzerland: Missonier-Piera (2004), Spain: de Albornoz and Illueca (2005) and France:
Lambert and Sponem (2005)), the United Kingdom (for example, Beattie, Brown, Ewers,
John, Manson, Thomas and Turner (1994) and Shah (1998)) and Australia (for example,
Wilson and Shailer (2007)).
There has been no similar work on opportunistic accounting choices by company
managers in a South African context.
51.2 Research objective
The objective of this research is to establish whether there is a relationship between
potentially opportunistic accounting choices made by the managers of South African
companies and share prices for those companies.  Specifically, evidence will be sought
as to whether there is a positive association between the number of profit-increasing,
income-smoothing and solvency-improving accounting choices made by the managers
of companies, and growth rates in the share prices of the companies.
1.3 Research methodology
The annual reports of all companies listed on South Africa’s only formal equities
exchange, The JSE Ltd, are publicly available.  The 2006 annual reports for a number of
JSE-listed companies were scrutinised for information about significant accounting
choices made by the companies’ directors.  This included such information as the
depreciation rates used for property, plant and equipment, and the actuarial assumptions
used in accounting for defined benefit funds.  The results of this process were recorded,
individually for each company, in the research instrument reproduced in Appendix E.
The accounting choices made by each company were then sorted into three schedules
based on the effect of each choice on one or more of the company’s profitability, income
volatility and solvency.  From these schedules, the number of profit-increasing, income-
smoothing and solvency-improving accounting choices made by each company was
determined.
Year end share price data for each company for the financial years 2003 to 2006 were
obtained from published investor handbooks.  From these data, the average growth rate
for each share during this three year period was calculated.  
Finally, correlation coefficients were calculated in order to facilitate an analysis of the
strength and direction of the relationships between the number of profit-increasing,
6income-smoothing and solvency-improving accounting choices made and share price
growth.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The remaining chapters of this thesis are structured as follows.
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature, with a concurrent development of the profit-
increasing, solvency-improving and volatility-reducing hypotheses of this thesis.  
Chapter 3 sets out the accounting choices, arising from the application of accounting
rules, that are available to the managers of South African companies.  These choices are
discussed in the context of their relationships with the hypotheses set out in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 4, the data are presented.  The company selection criteria, and way in which
the data were collected, are described.  Descriptive statistics are provided, followed by
detailed correlation calculations.  The results of the research are interpreted, and its
limitations are discussed.  In addition, a number of opportunities for future research are
identified.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with a summary of its aims, findings and implications.
7CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Introduction
Companies exist for a variety of reasons, such as relative ease of ownership transfer,
limited liability, economies of scale arising from pooled resources, and the separation of
ownership and management.  It is this last benefit of the corporate structure that is of
particular interest and focus in this thesis: an owner of a business who is not also its
manager has the freedom to own, or part-own, a number of businesses, allowing for
portfolio diversification.  On the other hand, a manager may be well-equipped with
appropriate skills, but lack sufficient wealth to become the owner of a company.  Seen
in this context, therefore, companies provide utility (wealth) maximising opportunities
for owners and managers.  
These opportunities, however, come at a cost.  It is the inevitable tension between owners
and managers in terms of who bears this cost (or rather, the greater part of the total cost)
that gives rise to the considerations of agency theory.
2.2 Agency theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) apply a positive approach to agency theory.  Prior to this
paper, most of the literature deals with normative aspects of the agency problem,
concentrating on the prescription of appropriate terms and structures for agency contracts,
in order to achieve an equitable distribution of costs and benefits. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) define an agency relationship as “a contract under
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making
authority to the agent.”  In the context of this thesis, the principals are the owners of the
company, and the agent is the company manager.
8Under an agency contract, the agent, as a rational utility maximiser, has incentives to act
in a self-interested manner, which may be to the detriment of the principal.  The
principal, who is also a utility maximiser, can limit such actions on the part of the agent
by “establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs
designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent.  In addition in some situations it will
pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take
certain actions which will harm the principal” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308).
While it is clearly rational for a principal to incur monitoring costs, the reasons why an
agent would accept bonding costs are less obvious.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) refer
to the following examples of incentives for the managers of companies to enter into
contracts that restrict their own actions: competition in the labour market (which causes
professional managers in competition for scarce positions to agree to new contracts that
are more restrictive than existing contracts) and reputational risk issues (which cause
managers to accept restrictions because they in any case intend to behave in a manner that
will not tarnish their reputations). 
Agency costs are the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs and a residual loss.  The
residual loss arises because of the impossibility of reaching a perfectly optimal agency
arrangement (ie there will always be at least “some divergence between the agent’s
decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal”
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308)).  
Agency costs reduce the total pool of wealth that a company generates.  Therefore, the
principals (owners) and agent (management) “collectively … have incentives to minimize
agency costs” (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994: 541).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) note
that the reduction of agency costs for companies is generally achieved by the owners
imposing, and management accepting, methods such as audits, internal controls, budget
restrictions and compensation arrangements that more closely identify the interests of
management with those of the owners.  As long as the marginal cost of these activities
is less than the marginal reduction in the cost of self-interested behaviour by
9management, total agency costs are reduced.
In companies, the methods used to reduce agency costs are typically based on contracts
which use accounting numbers as points of reference (see, for example, Holthausen and
Leftwich (1983), Christie and Zimmerman (1994) and Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001)).
The determination of these accounting numbers “for use in [agency] contracts is typically
required to be in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.  Yet, there
is discretion, or latitude, in how managers select and apply accounting [methods] within
the confines of acceptable principles … Managers [therefore] select and apply accounting
methods as a means to mitigate contractual restrictions on their behavior” (Heflin et al,
2002: 1047).  
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) note that rational owners are aware of the potential for
such behaviour on the part of managers, and therefore expected managerial opportunism
is ex ante priced into agency contracts.  The price protection of owners is, however,
imperfect.  Christie and Zimmerman (1994) point out that owners are exposed to the risk
of unexpected (excess) opportunism.  This risk cannot always be accurately priced at
contract inception because, for example, “(1) circumstances [may] change such that some
firms’ control systems allow managers to enrich themselves more than expected, or (2)
mistakes are made in writing the initial contracts” (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994: 541).
Management opportunism in the selection and application of accounting methods is
generally that which attempts to “increase management’s wealth via increases in share
price [or] via increases in incentive cash bonuses” (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978: 114).
The second of these mechanisms is really a subset of the first, in that cash bonuses can
be expected to be maximised when shareholder returns (a significant proportion of which
include share price changes) are maximised.
In the absence of cash bonuses, the link between management’s wealth and the
company’s share price arises from the existence of share-based compensation plans, in
which management is granted outright share ownership, or derivatives such as share
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options or share appreciation rights.  The fact that management posits the existence of an
additional link between opportunistic accounting methods and the company’s share price
means that they believe that “investors respond to accounting numbers per se, and do not
discriminate among accounting numbers produced by different accounting measurement
rules” (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983: 81).  In other words, and as noted in Chapter 1,
managers seem to think that the market is stupid.
This belief runs contrary to a significant body of theory and research on the efficiency of
markets.  This has it that, because of the efficiency of the market’s absorption of all
relevant information about a company, managers cannot systematically mislead the
market for their company’s shares through the selective application of opportunistic
accounting methods.  Therefore, “earnings manipulation may be fun, but its profitability
is doubtful” (Kaplan and Roll, 1972: 245).  As Shah (1998: 84) puts it: “if analysts are
able to ‘see through’ creative accounting devices as is suggested in the efficient markets
literature, why is it that companies continue to practice them?” 
2.3 The efficient market hypothesis
Fama (1970) describes a general notion of market efficiency.  In an efficient market,
“investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities
under the assumption that security prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all available
information” (Fama, 1970: 383).  In order to generate empirically testable implications
from this (somewhat extreme) assertion, Fama divides the universe of all available
information into information sets, and proposes a relationship between the expected price
of a security, the market rate of return and a given information set, as follows:
 j, t + 1 t  j, t + 1 t  j, t E(p *Ö ) = [1 + E(r *Ö )] p
 j, t  j, t + 1 j, t + 1 twhere p  is the price of security j at time t, p  is its price at time t + 1 and E(r *Ö )
tis the market’s risk-adjusted expected rate of return, given information set Ö  (Fama,
t1970: 384).  This implies that “the information in Ö  is fully utilized in determining
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tequilibrium expected returns … [and] this is the sense in which Ö  is ‘fully reflected’ in
 j, tthe formation of price p ” (Fama, 1970: 384).
Jensen (1978: 96) has a usefully succinct alternative description of Fama’s hypothesis:
t“a market is efficient with respect to information set è  if it is impossible to make
teconomic profits by trading on the basis of information set è ”.  (As the term is used by
Jensen, “economic profits” are profits in excess of the market risk-adjusted rate of return.
They are sometimes referred to as abnormal or excess profits.)
Empirical research on the efficient market hypothesis is usually classified on the same
basis as Fama applies in his 1970 paper, with reference to the nature of the information
set used to test market efficiency.  In weak form tests, the information set is past price or
return histories.  In semi-strong form tests, the responsiveness of security prices to all
obviously publicly available information  (such as annual financial statements and media
reports) is tested.  Finally, in strong form tests, the information set includes the previous
two, as well as relevant information that is monopolistically (privately) held, such as
management’s inside information (Fama, 1970: 388).
Empirical evidence has consistently been found for weak form tests.  Commentators’
interpretations of tests of the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis range from
“irrefutable” evidence against it (Levy, 1996: 432) to the statement that “there is evidence
inconsistent with the strong form, but that evidence is surprisingly scarce” (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986: 19).  In general, however, “we do not expect markets to be strong
form efficient … it would not be surprising if insiders were able to make superior profits
trading in their firms’ stock” (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2003: 278).
Evidence for, or against, semi-strong form tests is far more equivocal.  Levy (1996: 429),
for example, cites nine equity market studies, split 5 : 4 between supporting and rejecting
the hypothesis that markets are semi-strong form efficient.  This suggests that a semi-
strong efficiency continuum exists, ranging from completely inefficient to completely
efficient, and the placing of the equity market in this continuum is uncertain (and may,
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indeed, vary over time and between different equity markets).
Bearing in mind the fact that semi-strong tests of equity markets examine the
responsiveness of the market to the same accounting numbers that are the subject of
potential manipulation by opportunistic company managers, the possibility of the
existence of at least a degree of market inefficiency has the important implication that it
is rational for managers to expect that accounting manipulation can, at least sometimes,
be successful.  
2.4 The accepted set of accounting rules
Accounting method choices, opportunistic or otherwise, are available to a company’s
management only if the accepted set of accounting rules or standards permits such
choices.  In general, the accepted set “of accounting procedures within which managers
have discretion” (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 136) is established by the regulatory
authorities of the country in which the company is domiciled.
In a South African context, all companies listed on the country’s only formal equities
exchange, the JSE Ltd, are required to comply with International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRSs) published by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
In terms of the JSE’s rules, this has been a requirement for each listed company with
effect from its first financial year starting on or after 1 January 2005 (The JSE Ltd, 2008:
8.3).
There are two broad categories of accounting choices that arise from the application of
IFRSs, and that are therefore available to the managers of South African companies.
These are accounting policy choices, and choices in making estimates.  
Accounting policies are “the specific principles, bases, conventions, rules and practices
[established by IFRSs and] applied by an entity in preparing and presenting financial
statements” (IASB, 1993a: 5).  
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In its Preface to IFRSs, the IASB states that it is its objective to “require like transactions
and events to be accounted for in a like way … Consequently, the IASB intends not to
permit choices in accounting [policies] … [and it] will continue to reconsider those
transactions and events for which [its standards] permit a choice of accounting [policies],
with the objective of reducing the number of those choices” (IASB, 2002: 13).  This is
a curiously self-contradictory statement.  However, the IASB is in this awkward situation
for reasons that are largely political in nature, and outside the scope of interest of this
thesis.  It is sufficient to note that, although the IASB opposes accounting policy choices,
they nevertheless exist in its standards.  Relevant examples are discussed in Chapter 3.
As far as estimates are concerned, the IASB notes that “as a result of the uncertainties
inherent in business activities, [it is inevitable that] many items in financial statements
cannot be measured with precision but can only be estimated” (IASB, 1993a: 32).
Therefore, in contrast with choices in accounting policy, which are allowed by standard
setters for political reasons, choices in making estimates are an unavoidable part of
accounting for phenomena that occur in a real-world economic milieu.  The process of
making estimates when preparing financial statements will neither necessarily nor
automatically undermine their reliability, as long as the judgements upon which the
estimates are based are sound, and free from any kind of management bias:
If financial reports are to convey managers’ information on their
firms’ performance, standards must permit managers to exercise
judgment … Managers can then use their knowledge about the
business and its opportunities to [make estimates] that match the
firms’ business economics, potentially increasing the value of
accounting as a form of communication.  However, because
auditing is imperfect, management’s use of judgment also creates
opportunities for ‘earnings management’, in which managers
choose reporting methods and estimates that do not accurately
reflect their firms’ underlying economics (Healy and Wahlen,
14
1999: 366).
Relevant examples of choices in making estimates are discussed in Chapter 3.
2.5 Hypothesis development
2.5.1 Introduction
The preceding discussion has established the motive for accounting manipulation by
company managers (direct management interest in an increased share price because of
cash bonuses or share-based compensation plans), as well as the opportunity (the
availability of accounting choice, in the context of the reasonable expectation that
accounting choices matter because of the possibility of the existence of some semi-strong
equity market inefficiency).  This section discusses the means by which accounting
choice may be used to increase share prices, and develops appropriate hypotheses. 
Fields et al (2001: 275) note that “managers’ choice of accounting methods, consistent
with the goal of influencing stock [share] prices, can take several forms; managers may
maximise earnings in a given period, smooth earnings over time, avoid losses, or avoid
earnings declines (among other strategies).”  The first, third and fourth of these may be
regarded as having the common objective of increasing profit (in order to increase share
prices), and are treated as a single strategy in this thesis.  In addition to the profit-
increasing and income-smoothing strategies referred to by Fields et al (2001), a strategy
of improving solvency is also considered in this thesis.   
 
2.5.2 The profit-increasing strategy
In accordance with the observation by Fields et al (2001) that the profit-increasing
strategy has the aim of increasing income in a given period, this strategy is regarded in
this thesis as including profit-accelerating activities.  This approach is supported  by de
Albornoz and Alcarria (2003 : 446), who note that “poor current firm performance could
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lead to a manager being dismissed … [and therefore] managers will try to shift earnings
from the future to the current period when current performance is poor”, and Young
(1998: 132) who observes that “managers are hypothesised to employ accounting
procedures that shift reported earnings from future to current periods in an attempt to
maximise their current period income”.
Support for the proposition that share prices can be increased by means of increasing (or
accelerating) reported profit is first documented in an article that, according to Watts and
Zimmerman (1986: 37) “initially popularized positive research in accounting”.  Ball and
Brown (1968) investigate the association between accounting profits and share prices,
and predict that an unexpected increase in a company’s reported profit will result in a
positive abnormal rate of return in respect of that company’s shares.  They find evidence
that the accounting number has useful information content, and therefore also has value-
relevance to share prices.
Subsequent research has found similar evidence.  Perry and Williams (1994), for
example, find evidence for earnings manipulation in companies in the period prior to
management buyout offers.  Their results indicated that managers of such companies can
be expected to decrease profits, thereby attempting to reduce share prices (and the cost
of the buyout).  
Erickson and Wang (1999) hypothesise that firms involved in acquisitions, where the
medium of exchange is the acquirer’s own shares, will increase earnings in an attempt
to increase the value of the shares (and thereby reduce the number of shares that will have
to be exchanged).  They find evidence consistent with this expectation.
Beatty and Weber (2006) examine managers’ choices in accounting for goodwill
impairments.  They find evidence that indicates (Beatty and Weber, 2006: 284)  “that
firms’ equity market considerations [including share price] affect their preferences” for
the accounting treatment of goodwill, and that in general, such considerations mean that
firms attempt to increase earnings by avoiding goodwill impairment charges. 
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2.5.3 The income-smoothing strategy
The income-smoothing strategy may be “characterised as the propensity of managers to
choose accounting policies that increase (decrease) reported earnings when current-period
pre-managed earnings (i.e. before being manipulated) are below (above) a certain target”
(de Albornoz and Alcarria, 2003: 445).   
 In an early study, Gordon (1964) argues that managers seek to smooth income because
a stable earning series results in higher dividends and a higher share price.  Later research
linked reduced volatility with reduced risk, reduced cost of capital and a consequently
higher share price.  For example, “managers’ accounting discretion is driven by their
desire to reduce reported fluctuations around some predetermined level owing to the
association of the unpredictability of earnings with risk measures” (de Albornoz and
Alcarria, 2003: 445).   
A number of studies have found evidence for income-smoothing behaviour by managers.
Beattie et al (1994: 796) find evidence that “wealth-maximising managers [are] anxious
to smooth accounting earnings in order to maximise firm value”.  DeFond and Park
(1997) demonstrate that managers shift earnings from the future for use in the current
period when current earnings are poor and expected future earnings are good, and vice
versa.  Young (1998:142) studies “the determinants of managerial accounting discretion
for a heterogeneous sample of UK industrial and commercial firms [and finds that]
income smoothing considerations appear to dominate in the cross section”.  Wilson and
Shailer (2007: 265) find “clear evidence” of consistent income smoothing over a 55-year
period by a large Australian brewing company. 
2.5.4 The solvency-improving strategy
The accounting choices considered in this thesis are not limited to those that affect
earnings and, consequently, the income statement.  As Missonier-Piera (2004: 120) notes,
“most of the empirical studies focus almost exclusively on the effect on income when
investigating managers’ accounting choice.  Very few formulate hypotheses in terms of
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the effect on leverage ratios … [However,] there is no a priori reason to assume that
managers will prefer to alter the income statement over the balance sheet”.  The general
scramble by companies to “deleverage” their balance sheets (ie improve solvency) which
began in 2008 in response to the global financial crisis attests to the plausibility of this
assertion.
Apart from accounting choices that generally strengthen the balance sheet, companies
have been found to adopt accounting strategies that help them avoid debt covenant
violations, and the resultant reduction in share price.  Kuo (1993), for example,
investigates inventory accounting choices made by companies, and finds that “the greater
the amount of debt relative to equity in the company’s capital structure, the greater the
chance the company uses an [accounting] method to avoid covenant violation” (Kuo,
1993: 381).  Sweeney (1994) finds a relationship between firms approaching debt
covenant default and specific ameliorating accounting choices.  Missonier-Piera (2004:
122) hypothesises that “the more the firm relies on financial debt the more likely its
managers will choose accounting methods that … decrease leverage ratios” and finds
significant support for this.
2.5.5 Hypotheses
In the presence of appropriate compensation-based motivation, the availability of choice
within the accepted set of accounting rules, and in the context of the possibility of the
existence of some semi-strong equity market inefficiency, company managers can be
expected to select those accounting policies and make those accounting estimates that
maximise their wealth through increases in share price.  Therefore, the following
hypotheses are advanced:
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There is a positive relationship between
1H :   the number of profit-increasing accounting choices 
2H :   the number of income-smoothing accounting choices  
3H :   the number of solvency-improving accounting choices
4H :  the total number of profit-increasing, income-smoothing
and solvency-improving accounting choices 
made by the managers of South African listed companies and the
growth rates in share prices for those companies.  
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter establishes the logical link between the accounting choices made by
company managers and the share prices of companies, and develops the hypotheses that
will be tested later in this thesis. 
In the next chapter, the relevant accounting choices that are available to managers of
listed South African companies are discussed.  In addition, the mechanisms by which
each accounting choice achieves profit-increasing, income-smoothing or solvency-
improving objectives are explained. 
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CHAPTER 3
THE ACCOUNTING CHOICES
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter argues that, under specific conditions, company managers can be
expected to select those accounting policies and make those accounting estimates that
maximise their wealth through increases in share price.  This chapter sets out a number
of accounting policy choices and choices in making estimates that arise from the
application of IFRSs, and that are therefore available to the managers of listed South
African companies. 
The accounting choices discussed in this chapter, and selected for study in this thesis,
fulfill the following criteria.  Firstly, they all have an effect on one or more of a
company’s profits, income volatility or solvency.  Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2,
the potential for opportunism is attached to them, in that they can all be expected to have
an effect on a company’s share price.  Secondly, they are all discernible from publicly
available information (ie a listed company’s published annual financial statements). 
For each choice, this chapter provides an explanation of the accounting mechanisms by
which profit-increasing, income-smoothing or solvency-improving objectives may be
achieved.  
3.2 Technical context
In 2007, the IASB published revised versions of IAS 1 Presentation of Financial
Statements and IAS 23 Borrowing Costs.  The revised IAS 1 substantially changes the
structure and presentation of a number of financial statements, and renames almost all of
them.  For example, the balance sheet becomes the statement of financial position, and
the income statement (significantly restructured) becomes the statement of
comprehensive income.  The revised IAS 23 eliminates the choice (see 3.3.3) of
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capitalising borrowing costs, or treating them as an expense of the period in which they
are incurred.  Capitalisation of qualifying costs is now compulsory.
Both of these revised standards are applicable to financial statements that report on
financial periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009.  This thesis addresses financial
periods that ended on, or prior to, 31 December 2006, and therefore the discussion that
follows should be considered in the context of the previous versions of IAS 1 (published
in September 1997) and IAS 23 (published in December 1993).
3.3 Accounting policy choices
3.3.1 Property, plant and equipment
Companies have a choice in measuring items of property, plant and equipment (PPE)
under either the cost model or the revaluation model of IAS 16 Property, Plant and
Equipment (IASB, 1993b: 30 - 31).  The only limitation on the general availability of this
choice is that each category of PPE must be measured under the same model.  This means
that the company must, for example, revalue all (or none) of its machinery: it cannot
revalue one machine and not another.  On the other hand, the company is free to revalue
all of its machinery, and carry all of its property under the cost model, or vice versa.
In both models, PPE items are depreciated (and, if necessary, impairment losses against
the asset are recognised).  The key difference between them is that under the cost model,
the item is measured at historic cost (less allocations for depreciation and impairments),
while application of the revaluation model results in the item being measured at an
amount that approximates its current fair value.  
In the generally inflationary South African economic environment, therefore, application
of the revaluation model results in a higher carrying (measured) amount for a particular
PPE item than the cost model.  This higher carrying amount increases the total assets of
the company (and therefore improves its solvency ratios), but, because depreciation of
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PPE items is calculated on this higher carrying amount, the company’s profits in a given
period during the lifetime of the PPE item are decreased.  
In summary:
Measurement of PPE Profit-increasing
choice
Income-smoothing
choice
Solvency-improving
choice
Cost model Yes NA No*
Revaluation model No NA Yes
   No effect on income volatility*
3.3.2 Actuarial gains and losses
In measuring the asset or liability to include in its balance sheet in respect of any defined
benefit pension fund or other post-retirement defined benefit plan, a company is required
by IAS 19 Employee Benefits to apply a specific valuation methodology.  This involves
the use of actuarial assumptions in order to estimate the appropriate quantities for the
defined benefit valuation model inputs (IASB, 1998a: 50).  Actuarial assumptions are
estimates about matters that will occur in the (sometimes distant) future, such as
employee turnover, human mortality, inflation rates and expectations of returns on any
fund assets. It is therefore unavoidable that, with the passage of time, many estimates will
be found to have been inaccurate.  These inaccuracies are referred to as actuarial gains
and losses (IASB, 1998a: 7).
IAS 19 contains a number of accounting choices for a company that has actuarial gains
and losses (IASB, 1998a: 92 - 93A).  In addition to the option of immediately recognising
such losses and gains in the income statement, there are methods that permit part or all
of a company’s cumulative actuarial gains and losses to remain unrecognised (ie kept out
of the income statement) for a period of time.  For convenience, these are referred to in
this thesis as “slow” methods.  
The main slow method involves the use of a kind of virtual corridor: only those
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cumulative actuarial gains and losses that exceed the absolute value of this corridor are
recognised, and then only gradually, over the average remaining working lives of the
relevant employees.  The existence of any cumulative unrecognised actuarial losses will
reduce the liability (or increase the asset) recognised in respect of a company’s defined
benefit plan.  In addition, if actuarial losses are not recognised (or only partially
recognised) in a given year, the company’s profits are increased.  Finally, the use of the
corridor offers a company the opportunity to reduce the volatility of its profits over time,
because a significant proportion of the actuarial gains and losses that arise each year are
excluded from the income statement.
As another alternative, IAS 19 offers a faster method, sometimes referred to as the “direct
to equity” method.  Under this method, there are no unrecognised actuarial gains or
losses: these are all recognised immediately, in the financial year in which they occur.
However, the actuarial gains and losses are not recognised in the income statement (and
therefore do not affect the company’s profits); they are instead transferred directly to the
company’s balance sheet via the statement of changes in equity.  Therefore, the direct to
equity method offers the same profit-increasing and volatility-reducing opportunities as
the corridor method.  However, when there are cumulative unrecognised actuarial losses,
this method has balance sheet disadvantages, in that it results in a greater carrying amount
for the defined benefit liability (or a lesser amount for the asset).
Actuarial gains and losses Profit-increasing 
choice*
Income-smoothing
choice
Solvency-improving
choice*
Corridor method Yes Yes Yes
Direct to equity method Yes Yes No
   If there are cumulative unrecognised actuarial losses.*
3.3.3 Borrowing costs
Borrowing costs (interest expense and related costs arising from borrowed funds) that are
“directly attributable to the acquisition, construction or production” of certain assets may,
in terms of a choice offered by IAS23 Borrowing Costs, be treated as an expense of the
   The exceptions to this principle include borrowing costs capitalised to an intangible asset with an indefinite useful life,1
or to land, neither of which are depreciated.  In either case, if the asset is never sold by the company and is never
impaired, then the early increase in profits will never be offset by a later reduction.
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period in which they are incurred, or capitalised as part of the cost of the asset (IASB,
1993c: 4, 7 and 10).
In nearly all cases, the capitalisation of borrowing costs results in the acceleration of
profits, but no change in a company’s total profits measured over the life spans of the
assets involved: the early profit increase will (in nominal pre-tax terms) eventually
exactly offset the subsequent total profit reductions over the period for which the asset
is on the company’s balance sheet.1
For example, borrowing costs capitalised as part of the cost of a depreciable PPE item
will result in increased profits before depreciation starts, and, in nominal pre-tax terms,
an equivalent total amount of reduced profits in subsequent financial periods.  A similar
principle applies to non-depreciable investment property measured using the fair value
model: profits are increased before fair valuation of the property starts, and subsequently
reduced by an equivalent amount in the first year of the property’s use.  
In addition, capitalisation of borrowing costs results in an improvement in a company’s
solvency ratios.  This effect endures over the entire life span of depreciable and non-
depreciable PPE items and intangible assets, and for that portion of the life span of a fair
value model investment property prior to the commencement of the fair valuation
process. 
Borrowing costs Profit-accelerating
choice
Income-smoothing
choice
Solvency-improving
choice
Capitalise Yes NA Yes*
Treat as period expense No NA No
   No effect on income volatility*
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3.3.4 Investments designated as available-for-sale
A company’s equity and bond investments and other non-derivative financial assets may
be designated as available-for-sale financial assets, or not: in terms of IAS 39 Financial
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, the choice is a completely free one (IASB,
1999: 9).  If an investment is designated as an available-for-sale financial asset, any gains
and losses arising from changes in its fair value are not recognised in the income
statement; they are instead transferred directly to the company’s balance sheet via the
statement of changes in equity (IASB, 1999: 55).  In the absence of the sale or
impairment of a designated investment, the company’s profits are never affected. 
In the context of volatile financial markets, it is implausible that a company could draw
any advance conclusions about the effects on its profit or solvency measures of a decision
to designate its investments as available-for-sale.  However, the exclusion of changes in
investment fair values from its income statement, in light of the same market volatility,
would be a potentially attractive volatility-reducing choice.
Investment designation Profit-increasing 
choice
Income-smoothing
choice
Solvency-improving
choice
As available-for-sale No Yes No
Not designated No No No
3.3.5 Investment property
Investment property held by a company may be measured under either the cost model or
the fair value model of IAS 40 Investment Property (IASB, 2000: 30).  Under the cost
model, the investment property is depreciated (or rather, the buildings component of the
property is depreciated and the land component is normally not), and if necessary, any
impairment losses are recognised against it.  Under the fair value model, the property is
neither depreciated nor impaired: it is measured at its fair value at each balance sheet
date, with changes in fair value being recognised in the income statement (IASB, 2000:
33, 35 and 56).  
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In the generally inflationary South African property market, therefore, application of the
fair value model results in a higher carrying amount for an investment property than the
cost model.  In addition, in such a market the fair value model also results in higher
profits: there is no depreciation expense, and annual fair valuation increases are added
to each year’s profits.  
Investment property Profit-increasing choice Solvency-improving choice
Cost model No No
Fair value model Yes Yes
3.4 Choices in making estimates
3.4.1 Useful life estimates for property, plant and equipment
The depreciation expense charged to the income statement in respect of a particular PPE
item is inversely proportional to that item’s estimated useful life.  Putting this another
way, the higher the estimate made by a company in respect of the useful life of a
depreciable asset, the lower the depreciation expense, and the higher the company’s profit
in a given period during the useful life of the asset.  If, as is required under certain
circumstances by IFRSs, the depreciation charge is included in the cost of another asset
(such as inventories) instead of being recognised in the income statement, this principle
still holds true.  It simply occurs on a delayed basis, when the asset to which depreciation
has been allocated is sold, remeasured to fair value through the income statement,
impaired, or is itself depreciated.  A high bias in estimating useful life also results in a
higher carrying amount for the asset at any given stage during its useful life.
In an “adding up constraint” (Bagnoli and Watts, 2005: 788) similar to that arising from
the capitalisation of borrowing costs, a high bias in estimating useful life results in an
acceleration of profits, but no change in a company’s total profits measured over the life
span of the asset involved.  If the asset is held by the company for its entire useful life,
the total depreciation expense measured in nominal pre-tax terms is the same, regardless
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of the useful life estimate.  If the asset is sold before the end of its useful life, the gain
(loss) on sale will be lower (higher) with a high useful life bias, and the adding-up rule
will still apply.  Therefore:
PPE useful life Profit-accelerating choice Solvency-improving choice
Overstated (high bias) Yes Yes
Understated (low bias) No No
3.4.2 Actuarial assumptions
As explained in 3.3.2, a company is obliged to make estimates (referred to in this context
as actuarial assumptions) when it measures its defined benefit liability or asset.  The
defined benefit valuation model variables which must be estimated include discount rates,
inflation rates and expectations of returns on any fund assets, amongst others.  
It is inherent in the (usually) long term nature of a company’s defined benefit obligations
that any estimation bias on the part of the company has the potential to cause significant
distortions in the amount of the related expense and liability (or asset).  This capacity for
distortion is amplified by what commentators have referred to as the “broken” nature of
pension fund accounting under the IASB’s rules (see, for example, The Economist,
2004).  In particular, it is the IAS 19 corridor that is controversial, because of the income-
smoothing opportunities it offers.
The mechanisms by which defined benefit accounting can be manipulated through the
use of biased estimates are highly complex, and a detailed explanation of these is outside
the scope of this thesis.  Putting the matter simplistically (but nevertheless correctly), the
higher the rate used to discount any future cash payment obligation, the lower the present
value of the related liability.  Similarly, under the requirements of IAS 19 (and somewhat
counter-intuitively), it can be shown that the higher the discount rate, the lower the
interest expense, which is a component of defined benefit expense.  
   Although the periods involved are often very long, it can be shown that, in the end, the adding-up rule applies to any2
estimates made for defined benefit accounting.  The choices are therefore profit-accelerating rather than -increasing.
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In respect of estimates about the future rate of return on any plan assets, higher estimates
have the effect of lowering the defined benefit expense as well as the defined benefit
liability.  Finally, a low inflation estimate lowers both the related expense and liability.
Actuarial assumptions Profit-accelerating choice Solvency-improving choice2
Discount rate overstated (high bias) Yes Yes
Expected return overstated (high bias) Yes Yes
Expected inflation understated (low bias) Yes Yes
3.4.3 Impairment testing
Impairment testing of a company’s assets under the requirements of IAS 36 Impairment
of Assets is based on the premise that the amount at which an asset is carried in the
company’s balance sheet must not exceed the amount of economic benefits that will be
recovered from the future use of that asset by the company.  If the asset’s carrying amount
exceeds its recoverable amount, the asset is impaired, and it has to be written down,
usually via an impairment loss recognised in the income statement (IASB, 1998b: 59 -
60). 
Measurement of the recoverable amount of any asset under the requirements of IAS 36
normally involves a calculation of the asset’s value in use, which is the present value of
the future cash flows expected to be derived from the asset (IASB, 1998b: 6).  This
means that the lower the rate used by the company in discounting its estimated future
cash flows, the higher the asset’s value in use, and also the higher its recoverable amount.
Because of the relationship between recoverable amount and carrying amount, a high bias
in measuring recoverable amount will reduce the possibility of having to recognise an
impairment loss.
28
In a similar fashion, the estimates of future cash flows can themselves be biased: the
higher the estimated growth rate in these cash flows, the higher the resulting recoverable
amount.  
Impairment test assumptions Profit-accelerating choice Solvency-improving choice
Discount rate understated (low bias) Yes Yes
Growth rate overstated (high bias) Yes Yes
3.4.4 Reversal of unused provisions
Under the requirements of IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent
Assets, a company may not create fictitious provisions: a provision may only be
recognised in situations where a current obligation genuinely exists, and the company is
in compliance with a set of specific requirements (IASB, 1998c: 14 - 26).  
The use of imaginary provisions facilitates the practice of “hidden reserve” accounting.
Hidden reserves provide income-smoothing opportunities: in a year of higher than
expected profits, the recognition of a fictitious provision creates a reserve which can be
released to the income statement in a future year when profits are lower than expected.
Although the recognition requirements of IAS 37 do not permit the creation of such
provisions, the choices made by a company in estimating the amount at which to measure
a valid provision may well be biased towards higher valuations in good years and lower
valuations in bad years.  In addition, a company is free to (indeed, is required to) reverse
a provision if it assesses at balance sheet date that “it is no longer probable that an
outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the
obligation” (IASB, 1998d: 59).
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The reversal of an unused provision, or part of it (debit balance sheet, credit income
statement) results in an increase in profits and a decrease in liabilities, and provides
opportunities for income-smoothing.
Provision accounting Profit-increasing 
choice
Income-smoothing
choice
Solvency-improving
choice
Unused amounts reversed Yes Yes Yes
No reversals No No No
3.4.5 Indefinite useful life intangible assets
In its assessment of the length of an intangible asset’s useful life, a company is permitted
by IAS38 Intangible Assets to conclude that this is indefinite (IASB, 1998d: 88).  If an
intangible asset is considered by the company to have an indefinite useful life, it is not
amortised.  This is in contrast with an intangible asset that is assessed as having a finite
useful life, which must be amortised over its estimated useful life, and carried in the
balance sheet at an amount from which accumulated amortisation has been deducted
(IASB, 1998d: 74, 97 and 107).
Amortisation expense is recognised in the income statement.  Therefore, treating any
intangible asset as having an indefinite useful life will increase or accelerate profits, and
increase the carrying amount of the company’s total assets.  (The adding-up rule will
apply only if the intangible asset is eventually sold.  If it is never sold, there will be a net
increase in profits over the entire existence of the company.)
Intangible assets Profit-increasing choice Solvency-improving choice
Indefinite useful life Yes Yes
Finite useful life No No
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter sets out the mechanisms by which a number of accounting policy and
estimate choices have an effect on the amount or timing of a company’s profits, income
volatility or solvency.  
All of the choices selected for analysis in this thesis are discernible from the published
annual financial statements of listed companies.  Accordingly, the next chapter describes
the selection of a number of South African listed companies, and the collection of
accounting data from their financial statements.  Various analyses of this data are then
carried out, and possible interpretations of the results are discussed.   
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHOD, DATA AND RESULTS
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter illustrates the mechanisms by which a number of accounting
choices can be used by company managers to achieve profit-increasing, income-
smoothing and solvency-improving strategies.  This chapter explains the criteria in terms
of which a set of South African listed companies were selected for analysis, and describes
the methods used to collect data about accounting choices and share prices in respect of
these companies.  Following this, the data are analysed in order to test the hypotheses
developed in Chapter 2.  Finally, the results of the analyses are discussed.
4.2 The mid cap companies
The hypotheses of this thesis are tested in the setting of the group of medium-sized South
African listed companies known as the “mid cap” companies.  It is common for equity
exchanges or fund managers to classify companies on the basis of their size (which is
usually established  with reference to a company’s market capitalisation).  In the United
States, for example, mid cap companies are considered to be those with a market
capitalisation in the range of approximately $2 billion to $10 billion (with some
variations in this range between different fund managers).  
In South Africa, the JSE has a formal definition for mid cap companies: “the 60
companies which are constituents of the FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index ranked 41 -
100 by full market capitalisation” (FTSE, 2007: 6).  This is not a static group: every three
months (in March, June, September and December), the market capitalisations of
companies listed on the JSE are recalculated as the companies’ share prices change.  The
quarterly review also takes into account any new listings and delistings.  The companies
are then reordered by size, for membership of the appropriate index group for the next
three months. 
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At the date of selection of the companies for analysis in this thesis (see 4.3), the market
capitalisation of the JSE mid cap companies ranged from R1,9 billion (Rainbow Chicken
Ltd) to R20,2 billion (Aveng Ltd).  The total market capitalisation of this group of
companies was R573,1 billion, with a mean of R9,6 billion (FTSE/JSE Advisory
Committee, 2007).
The mid cap companies are selected as an appropriate group for analysis for three
reasons.  Firstly, many investors and fund managers have an interest in mid cap
companies as a group because they view them as the “Goldilocks” choice of the
investment world: in their opinion, mid cap companies offer a balanced, “just right” mix
of the best qualities of larger companies (such as stability) and smaller companies (such
as growth potential).  
Secondly, and with reference to the point made in Chapter 2 about the equivocal nature
of evidence for or against the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, this
is particularly the case with mid cap companies.  For example, “pointing at the wide
dispersion of returns between top and bottom quartile managers [of mid cap funds], Yale
University’s endowment fund star manager David Swensen shows that mid cap stocks
constitute an inherently inefficient market.  The inefficiency of mid cap stocks comes
from many well known factors: relatively reduced scrutiny from investors and brokers,
less readily available information and the more fragmented nature of the market itself”
(Sarkis, 2007: 82).  Although semi-strong market inefficiency is not assumed in testing
the hypotheses of this thesis, the possibility of its existence in mid cap companies
nevertheless suggests a potentially advantageous environment for opportunistic behaviour
by company managers. 
Thirdly, the 60 JSE mid cap companies represent an appropriate number of companies
in the context of the company selection criteria, manual data collection techniques (see
4.4) and analytical methods (see 4.6) applied in this thesis.
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4.3 Company selection criteria
The source of data about accounting choices is each mid cap company’s financial
statements for its financial year ended during the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December
2006.  This period was selected for the reason that it represents a recent and complete
data set at the time of the analysis.  Under South African legislation, companies are
required to produce annual reports at their annual general meetings, which must occur no
later than nine months after year end (South Africa, 1973: 179 and 286).  Six of the
selected companies have 31 December year ends.  Therefore, in order to identify the mid
cap companies consistently with the latest date by which their 2006 annual reports were
required to have been published (30 September 2007), the FTSE/JSE September 2007
Index Series quarterly review is used (FTSE/JSE Advisory Committee, 2007).  The
identification of the companies from the September 2007 quarterly review also means
that sufficient time is allowed for the information contained in all 2006 annual reports to
be reflected in share price movements.
The accounting choices of companies in a number of industries are constrained by
industry-specific financial reporting requirements in IFRSs, South African legislation or
the JSE’s listing requirements.  Therefore, mid cap companies in the JSE’s financial
services, insurance or resources super-sectors are excluded.  They are listed in the
following sectors: real estate, including property unit trusts (8 mid cap companies),
mining (5), general financial (4) and insurance (3).  In addition, one industrial metals
company, Hulamin Ltd, is excluded because it was listed for the first time in 2007.  A
total of 21 companies are excluded.  
The remaining 39 mid cap companies that are included in the analysis are listed in JSE
sectors such as general retailers (8 companies), food producers (5) and construction, food
retailers, industrial transportation and media (3 each).  Appendix A contains a complete
list of the sectors represented by these companies.  
Table 1 below lists the 39 mid cap companies included in the analysis, together with each
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company’s JSE short name, which is used for reference purposes in subsequent tables and
analyses.  Table 2 lists the excluded companies. 
 
Table 1: Included companies
  
Company name JSE short name   JSE sector
1 AECI Ltd AECI Chemicals
2 African Oxygen Ltd AFROX Chemicals
3 Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd ALTRON Electronic & electrical equipment
4 Allied Technologies Ltd ALTECH Mobile telecommunications
5 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd ASPEN Pharmaceuticals
6 Astral Foods Ltd ASTRAL Food producers
7 Aveng Ltd AVENG Construction & materials
8 AVI Ltd A-V-I Food producers
9 Caxton and CTP Ltd CAXTON Media
10 Datatec Ltd DATATEC Software & computer services
11 Dimension Data Holdings Plc DIDATA Software & computer services
12 Ellerine Holdings Ltd ELLERINE General retailers
13 Foschini Ltd FOSCHINI General retailers
14 Gold Reef Resorts Ltd GOLDREEF Travel & leisure
15 Grindrod Ltd GRINDROD Industrial transportation
16 Group Five Ltd GROUP 5 Construction & materials
17 Highveld Steel And Vanadium Ltd HIVELD Industrial metals
18 Illovo Sugar Ltd ILLOVO Food producers
19 JD Group Ltd JDGROUP General retailers
20 Johnnic Communications Ltd JOHNCOM Media
21 Lewis Group Ltd LEWIS General retailers
22 Massmart Holdings Ltd MASSMART General retailers
23 Medi-Clinic Corporation Ltd MEDCLIN Health care equipment & services
24 Mr Price Group Ltd MRPRICE General retailers
25 Mvelaphanda Group Ltd MVELAGRP Support services
26 Nampak Ltd NAMPAK General industrials
27 New Clicks Holdings Ltd NUCLICKS General retailers
28 Pick ‘n Pay Stores Ltd PICKNPAY Food & drug retailers
29 Primedia Ltd PRIMEDIA Media
30 Rainbow Chicken Ltd RAINBOW Food producers
31 Reunert Ltd REUNERT Electronic & electrical equipment
32 Shoprite Holdings Ltd SHOPRIT Food & drug retailers
33 Sun International Ltd SUNINT Travel & leisure
34 Super Group Ltd SUPRGRP Industrial transportation
35 The Spar Group Ltd SPAR Food & drug retailers
36 Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd TONGAAT Food producers
37 Trencor Ltd TRENCOR Industrial transportation
38 Truworths International Ltd TRUWTHS General retailers
39 Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd WBHO Construction & materials
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Table 2: Excluded companies 
Company name JSE short name JSE sector
1 African Bank Investments Ltd ABIL General financials
2 ApexHi Properties Ltd APEXHI Real estate
3 Discovery Holdings Ltd DISCOVERY Life insurance
4 Eland Platinum Holdings Ltd ELAND Mining
5 Emira Property Fund EMIRA Real estate
6 Fountainhead Property Trust Ltd FPT Real estate
7 Growthpoint Properties Ltd GROWPNT Real estate
8 Hulamin Ltd HULAMIN Industrial metals (but listed 2007)
9 Hyprop Investments Ltd HYPROP Real estate
10 JSE Ltd JSE General financial
11 Metorex Ltd METOREX Mining
12 Metropolitan Holdings Ltd METLTD Life insurance
13 Mvelaphanda Resources Ltd MVELA RES Mining
14 Northam Platinum Ltd NORTHAM Mining
15 Pangbourne Properties Ltd PANPROP Real estate
16 Peregrine Holdings Ltd PERGRIN General financial
17 PSG Group Ltd PSG General financial
18 Redefine Income Fund Ltd REDEFINE Real estate
19 SA Corporate Real Estate Fund Ltd SA CORP Real estate
20 Santam Ltd SANTAM Nonlife insurance
21 Wesizwe Platinum Ltd WESIZWE Mining
4.4 Data collection
4.4.1 Introduction
The required level of detail about accounting policy and estimate choices is not available
from electronic databases.  Therefore, the data were collected manually from each
company’s 2006 published annual report.  The research instrument reproduced in
Appendix E was used for this purpose.  The following details were recorded for each
company:
N year ends, name of auditor, whether the audit report was qualified or unqualified,
total assets at year end and (after tax) profit for the year
   The appropriate level of management for testing the hypotheses of this thesis is the board of executive directors.  In3
the remainder of the thesis, the terms “manager” and “director” are used interchangeably.
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N whether the company has a performance bonus plan for its executive directors3
N data in respect of the accounting choices discussed in Chapter 3:
N cost or revaluation model for property, plant and equipment
N depreciation rates
N treatment of actuarial gains and losses
N actuarial assumptions
N borrowing costs capitalised or not
N discount and growth rates for impairment testing
N reversal of unused provisions
N existence of indefinite useful life intangible assets
N investments designated as available-for-sale
N cost or fair value model for investment property.
4.4.2 Year ends, audit reports, assets and profit
As required by the research design, the annual reports that were scrutinised were for each
company’s financial year end that occurred during the 2006 calendar year.  The most
common year end was 30 June (13 companies) followed by 31 March (7), 30 September
and 31 December (6 each), 28 February (4) and 31 August (3).
The majority (34) of the companies were audited by “big four” auditing firms, with
Deloitte appointed by 13 companies, PricewaterhouseCoopers by 10, KPMG by 8, and
Ernst & Young somewhat under-represented in this group with 3 audits.  The remaining
companies were audited by mid-tier firms: PKF (3), Grant Thornton and BDO Spencer
Steward (1 each).  All audit reports were unqualified, with two direct implications.
Firstly,  the auditors were in agreement with the accounting policies and estimates of the
companies’ directors.  Secondly (and presuming approximately equivalent audit quality
across all companies), all companies were under approximately equivalent constraints on
the accounting choices made.
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The total assets as recorded in the companies’ 2006 balance sheets ranged from R1,68
billion (Primedia) to R12,44 billion (Nampak), with a mean of R5,66 billion.  None of
the companies made a loss for the 2006 financial year.  The lowest after tax profit was
recorded by Group 5 (R148 million), and the highest by JD Group at R1 457 million.
The mean profit was R659 million.
4.4.3 Performance bonus plan for directors 
. 
In Chapter 2, it is noted that it is the presence of appropriate compensation-based
motivation, in the form of cash bonuses or share-based compensation plans, that creates
the incentive for directors to make opportunistic accounting choices.
All of the companies included in the analysis had such compensation arrangements in
place in the 2006 financial year.  29 companies had share option plans for directors, and
3 had share appreciation rights plans.  The remainder had mixed plans: 4 offered a
combination of options and share appreciation rights, 2 offered option and cash bonus
plans, and 1 company had a share trust in combination with a cash bonus plan.
4.4.4 The accounting choices
The remainder of the research instrument was used to record data about the accounting
choices.  In most cases (see exceptions in next paragraph), this was a straightforward
process of recording the response to a binary closed-ended question (eg “were unused
provisions reversed during the year: yes or no?”, or “which model was used for property,
plant and equipment: cost or revaluation?”).  All of these matters were established with
reference to the information contained in each company’s accounting policy or other
notes to the financial statements.  The results were sorted into profit-increasing, income-
smoothing and solvency-improving categories, and then recorded in the separate
schedules shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 below.
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Table 3: Profit-increasing choices
Cost
m odel
for
PPE
Corridor
for
actuarial
gains and
losses
Direct-to-
equity for
actuarial
gains and
losses
Borrow-
ing
costs
capital-
ised
Fair value
m odel for
investm ent
property 
High
bias for 
PPE
useful
life
Bias in
actuarial 
assum p-
tions
Bias in
im pair-
m ent
tests
Unused
prov-
isions
reversed
Indefinite
useful life
intangible
assets
Total profit
increasing
choices
m ade
AECI Y Y N Y NA Y N Y Y N 6
AFROX Y Y N Y NA Y Y N N N 5
ALTRON Y Y N Y NA N Y Y N Y 6
ALTECH Y Y N N NA N Y Y N Y 5
ASPEN Y N N Y Y N N Y N N 4
ASTRAL Y Y N Y NA Y Y N N N 5
AVENG Y Y N N NA N N N N N 2
A-V-I Y Y N Y NA Y N Y N Y 6
CAXTON N NA NA N NA Y N Y NS Y 4
DATATEC Y NA NA N NA N N Y Y N 3
DIDATA Y NA NA Y NA N N Y N N 3
ELLERINE Y N N N Y N Y Y N Y 5
FOSCHINI Y N N N NA N Y Y N N 3
GOLDREEF Y NA NA Y NA Y N Y N N 4
GRINDROD Y N N Y NA N N Y N Y 4
GROUP 5 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N 7
HIVELD Y N Y Y NA N N Y Y N 5
ILLOVO Y Y N Y NA Y N Y N N 5
JDGROUP Y Y N Y NA N N N N N 3
JOHNCOM Y N N Y NA N N Y N N 3
LEWIS Y Y N N NA N Y Y NS N 5
MASSMART Y N N N NA Y Y N N N 3
MEDCLIN Y N N N NA Y N Y N N 3
MRPRICE Y Y N N NA N N Y Y N 4
MVELAGRP Y NA NA N NA N N Y N Y 3
NAMPAK Y N Y Y N N Y N Y N 5
NUCLICKS Y N N N Y Y N Y Y Y 6
PICKNPAY Y Y N N NA N Y Y NS Y 6
PRIMEDIA Y N N N NA Y N N Y Y 4
RAINBOW Y Y N N NA Y Y N N N 4
REUNERT Y Y N N NA Y Y N Y N 5
SHOPRIT Y N N N NA N N N Y N 2
SUNINT Y N N Y NA Y N Y NS Y 6
SUPRGRP N NA NA Y NA N N Y NS Y 4
SPAR Y Y N N NA N N N N N 2
TONGAAT Y N N N NA Y N Y N N 3
TRENCOR Y N N N NA Y Y Y N Y 5
TRUWTHS Y Y N N NA N N N N N 2
WBHO Y Y N Y NA Y Y N Y N 6
          NA:  Company does not have a defined benefit plan, or company does not have investment property.
          NS:  Not stated in annual report.
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Table 4: Income-smoothing choices
Corridor for
actuarial gains and
losses
Direct-to-equity for
actuarial gains and
losses
Investm ents
designated as
available-for-sale
Unused provisions
reversed
Total volatility
reducing choices
m ade
AECI Y N Y Y 3
AFROX Y N N N 1
ALTRON Y N Y N 2
ALTECH Y N Y N 2
ASPEN N N Y N 1
ASTRAL Y N NS N 2
AVENG Y N Y N 2
A-V-I Y N Y N 2
CAXTON NA NA Y NS 2
DATATEC NA NA N Y 1
DIDATA NA NA Y N 1
ELLERINE N N N N 0
FOSCHINI N N Y N 1
GOLDREEF NA NA Y N 1
GRINDROD N N N N 0
GROUP 5 N N N Y 1
HIVELD N Y Y Y 3
ILLOVO Y N Y N 2
JDGROUP Y N Y N 2
JOHNCOM N N N N 0
LEWIS Y N Y NS 3
MASSMART N N N N 0
MEDCLIN N N Y N 1
MRPRICE Y N NA Y 2
MVELAGRP NA NA N N 0
NAMPAK N Y N Y 2
NUCLICKS N N N Y 1
PICKNPAY Y N Y NS 3
PRIMEDIA N N N Y 1
RAINBOW Y N N N 1
REUNERT Y N N Y 2
SHOPRIT N N Y Y 2
SUNINT N N Y NS 2
SUPRGRP NA NA N NS 1
SPAR Y N N N 1
TONGAAT N N N N 0
TRENCOR N N Y N 1
TRUWTHS Y N N N 1
WBHO Y N N Y 2
          NA:  Company does not have a defined benefit plan, or company does not have investments (financial assets).
          NS:  Not stated in annual report.
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Table 5: Solvency-improving choices
Revalua
-tion
m odel
for PPE
Corridor
for
actuarial
gains and
losses
Borrowing
costs
capitalised
Fair value
m odel for
investm ent
property 
High
bias for
PPE
useful
life
Bias in
actuarial
assum p-
tions
Bias in
im pair-
m ent
 tests
Unused
provisions
reversed
Indefinite
useful life 
intangible
assets
Total
solvency
im proving
choices
m ade
AECI N Y Y NA Y N Y Y N 5
AFROX N Y Y NA Y Y N N N 4
ALTRON N Y Y NA N Y Y N Y 5
ALTECH N Y N NA N Y Y N Y 4
ASPEN N N Y Y N N Y N N 3
ASTRAL N Y Y NA Y Y N N N 4
AVENG N Y N NA N N N N N 1
A-V-I N Y Y NA Y N Y N Y 5
CAXTON Y NA N NA Y N Y NS Y 5
DATATEC N NA N NA N N Y Y N 2
DIDATA N NA Y NA N N Y N N 2
ELLERINE N N N Y N Y Y N Y 4
FOSCHINI N N N NA N Y Y N N 2
GOLDREEF N NA Y NA Y N Y N N 3
GRINDROD N N Y NA N N Y N Y 3
GROUP 5 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N 6
HIVELD N N Y NA N N Y Y N 3
ILLOVO N Y Y NA Y N Y N N 4
JDGROUP N Y Y NA N N N N N 2
JOHNCOM N N Y NA N N Y N N 2
LEWIS N Y N NA N Y Y NS N 4
MASSMART N N N NA Y Y N N N 2
MEDCLIN N N N NA Y N Y N N 2
MRPRICE N Y N NA N N Y Y N 3
MVELAGRP N NA N NA N N Y N Y 2
NAMPAK N N Y N N Y N Y N 3
NUCLICKS N N N Y Y N Y Y Y 5
PICKNPAY N Y N NA N Y Y NS Y 5
PRIMEDIA N N N NA Y N N Y Y 3
RAINBOW N Y N NA Y Y N N N 3
REUNERT N Y N NA Y Y N Y N 4
SHOPRIT N N N NA N N N Y N 1
SUNINT N N Y NA Y N Y NS Y 5
SUPRGRP Y NA Y NA N N Y NS Y 5
SPAR N Y N NA N N N N N 1
TONGAAT N N N NA Y N Y N N 2
TRENCOR N N N NA Y Y Y N Y 4
TRUWTHS N Y N NA N N N N N 1
WBHO N Y Y NA Y Y N Y N 5
          NA:  Company does not have a defined benefit plan, or company does not have investment property.
          NS:  Not stated in annual report.
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Data in three categories (depreciation rates, actuarial assumptions and the estimates used
in impairment testing) were subjected to further analysis in order to determine whether
profit-increasing or solvency-improving choices had been made.  (None of these three
matters could be expected to have any directly discernible effect on income-smoothing.)
For depreciation rates, data relating to four commonly-held categories of property, plant
and equipment are recorded in the schedule shown in Appendix B: buildings, plant,
computer equipment and vehicles.  The mean depreciation rate in each category was
calculated, and any depreciation rate for a given asset category for a given company that
was less than this mean was treated as one incident of a high bias estimate for useful life
(bearing in mind the inverse relationship between depreciation rate and useful life).  The
count of biased estimates for each company was then converted into a response to a
binary question (“generally high bias for the useful life of property, plant and equipment:
yes or no?”) by calculating the mean number of biased estimates for the 39 companies
(2,2) and treating any company with more than this number of biased estimates (ie 3 or
4) as having a generally high bias.  These responses were then carried to the appropriate
column in each of Tables 3 and 5.
A similar methodology was applied to determine the existence, or otherwise, of profit-
increasing or solvency-improving biases in actuarial assumptions and impairment test
estimates (see Appendices C and D).  In all cases, where a situation was not applicable
to a company (eg it does not have plant, or it does not have a defined benefit plan), it was
recorded as being not applicable (NA) and was counted as an unbiased estimate.  On the
other hand, where a company, in direct contravention of the disclosure requirements of
IFRSs, simply omitted information, this was recorded as “not stated” (NS) and was
treated as an incident of a biased estimate.
4.4.5 Share price data
Year end share prices for listed companies are typically recorded in stock exchange
investors’ handbooks, and for the purposes of this study were obtained from these sources
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(Profile Media, 2003 and 2007).  For each company, the share price at the financial year
end in each of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 is recorded in Table 6.  Total growth and the
average growth rate in share price for each company for the three-year interval were
calculated.  The three-year review period, ending in the same period as the annual reports
that were scrutinised, was selected because it provides a sufficiently substantial period
in which to determine average growth rates in share prices.
In this thesis, therefore, the relationship that is used to test the hypotheses is that between
the accounting choices made in companies’ 2006 annual reports, and their historical share
price growth for the three-year period ending in 2006.  The decision to investigate this
particular relationship is justified largely on pragmatic grounds, in light of the prohibitive
effort that would be required to establish (using manual techniques) those accounting
choices that were applied by each company in each of their 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006
financial years.  This decision has the obvious consequence that the research design
assumes a substantive constancy in accounting choices for the period 2003 - 2006.
Possible implications of this assumption are discussed below (see 4.6).
In addition, at least two years’ of each company’s share price data relates to the period
prior to the JSE’s 1 January 2005 formal transition date to IFRSs referred to in Chapter
2 (see 2.4).  However, this is of less concern than the matter discussed in the previous
paragraph, because the independent development of unique standards in South Africa
effectively ended in the early 1990s.  South African Statements of Generally Accepted
Accounting Practice have been identical, or near-identical, copies of the relevant IASB
publication since that time.
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Table 6: Share prices
2003 2004 2005 2006 Total growth
2003 - 2006 (%)
Mean annual
growth 
2003 - 2006 (%)
AECI 3400 3900 5300 6825 100.7 26.5
AFROX 1610 1940 2330 2950 83.2 22.4
ALTRON 820 1105 1555 2550 211.0 46.5
ALTECH 2108 3225 4350 5150 144.3 35.4
ASPEN 775 1270 2380 3650 371.0 68.2
ASTRAL 2395 4071 7100 8650 261.2 55.4
AVENG 880 740 1235 2145 143.8 41.6
A-V-I 1525 1810 1320 1380 -9.5 -1.3
CAXTON 595 820 1085 1499 151.9 36.1
DATATEC 500 1480 959 2200 340.0 96.7
DIDATA 301 361 425 508 68.8 19.1
ELLERINE 2700 3689 6100 6700 148.1 37.3
FOSCHINI 1070 1995 3555 5826 444.5 76.2
GOLDREEF 601 1265 1470 2060 242.8 55.6
GRINDROD 238 790 1275 1560 555.5 105.2
GROUP 5 520 1100 1539 2875 452.9 79.4
HIVELD 1530 4800 8480 7799 409.7 94.1
ILLOVO 687 800 810 1660 141.6 40.9
JDGROUP 3161 4550 7400 6660 110.7 32.2
JOHNCOM 1378 2062 3730 6099 342.6 64.7
LEWIS NYL NYL 3351 6160 83.8 83.8
MASSMART 2100 3270 4477 4700 123.8 32.5
MEDCLIN 750 1200 1530 2065 175.3 40.8
MRPRICE 460 795 1145 2140 365.2 67.9
MVELAGRP 670 750 640 760 13.4 5.3
NAMPAK 1230 1410 1589 1820 48.0 14.0
NUCLICKS 665 770 810 1035 55.6 16.3
PICKNPAY 1245 1760 2310 3030 143.4 34.6
PRIMEDIA 440 940 1150 1630 270.5 59.2
RAINBOW 325 545 650 950 192.3 44.4
REUNERT 1710 2790 4230 6814 298.5 58.6
SHOPRIT 640 940 1465 2540 296.9 58.7
SUNINT 2913 4050 6185 8360 187.0 42.3
SUPRGRP 560 1070 1040 1200 114.3 34.6
SPAR NYL NYL 3090 3635 17.6 17.6
TONGAAT 3350 5404 8150 11200 234.3 49.9
TRENCOR 1020 1451 2100 3050 199.0 44.1
TRUWTHS 730 1011 1740 2150 194.5 44.7
WBHO 1000 1900 2980 5200 420.0 73.8
NYL:  Company not yet listed. 
      Share prices are in cents.
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4.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 7 lists the number of companies making each of the accounting choices discussed
in Chapter 3.
Table 7: The individual accounting choices 
Accounting choice Alternative 1 Alternative 2 * *
1 Measurement model for PPE Cost: 37 (94,9%) Revaluation: 2 (5,1%)
2 Actuarial gains and losses corridor Yes: 17 (51,5%) No: 16 (48,5%)1
3 Actuarial gains and losses direct to equity Yes: 2 (12,5%) No: 14 (87,5%)2
4 Borrowing costs Capitalise: 18 (46,2%) Expense: 21 (53,8%)
5 Investments designated as available for sale Yes: 19 (48,7%) No: 20 (51,3%)
6 Measurement model for investment property Cost: 1 (20,0%) Fair value: 4 (80,0%)3
7 Useful life estimate for PPE High bias: 18 (46,2%) Low bias: 21 (53,8%)
8 Actuarial assumptions Biased: 15 (45,5%) Unbiased: 18 (54,5%)1
9 Impairment test assumptions Biased: 26 (66,7%) Unbiased: 13 (33,3%)
10 Unused provisions reversed Yes: 16 (41,0%) No: 23 (59,0%)
11 Indefinite useful life intangible assets Yes: 13 (33,3%) No: 26 (66,7%)
  These columns show the number (percentage) of companies choosing that option*
  Excluding 6 companies without defined benefit plans1
  Excluding 6 companies without defined benefit plans and 17 that apply the corridor approach2
  Excluding 34 companies without investment property3
In three cases (measurement model for property, plant and equipment, adoption of the
direct to equity method for actuarial gains and losses, and measurement model for
investment property), one option is heavily favoured over the other.  
In the case of the measurement model for property, plant and equipment, the revaluation
model finds very little favour.  Although, as noted in Chapter 3, revaluation accounting
is a solvency-improving choice, it comes at the cost of an increased depreciation charge,
which puts pressure on profitability measures.  It is notable that a large majority of
companies choose the profit-increasing option over the solvency-improving option when
there is a trade-off. 
The direct to equity method for actuarial gains and losses offers both profit-increasing
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and income-smoothing opportunities, so it is interesting that relatively few companies
have adopted it.  This may be due to the fact that the availability of this approach arises
from a relatively recent modification to IAS 19 Employee Benefits.  Companies adopting
the direct to equity option for financial years beginning before 1 January 2006 are subject
to a complex set of transitional provisions (IASB, 1998a: 159C), and many of them may
therefore have chosen to avoid potential difficulties arising from early adoption. 
Finally, the highly restrictive definition in IAS 40 Investment Property means that very
few companies have property that meets the required criteria.  However, of the five
companies that do have investment property, a significant majority have chosen the
profit-increasing option, and adopted the fair value model.
Table 8 below summarises the key data which are used in the hypothesis testing (see 4.6):
the number of accounting choices made by each company in each category, the total
number of accounting choices made, and the mean annual growth rate in each company’s
share price for the three-year period from the 2003 financial year end to the 2006 year
end.  These data are derived from Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6.  To add to the informativeness of
the table, it is ranked in descending order of the total number of accounting choices made
(primary key) and mean annual growth rate (secondary key).
46
Table 8: Company ranking by total number of choices made
Profit-
increasing
choices
Income-
smoothing
choices
Solvency-
improving
choices
Total
choices
Mean annual growth
in share price
 2003 - 2006 (%)
GROUP 5 7 1 6 14 79.4
PICKNPAY 6 3 5 14 34.6
AECI 6 3 5 14 26.5
WBHO 6 2 5 13 73.8
ALTRON 6 2 5 13 46.5
SUNINT 6 2 5 13 42.3
A-V-I 6 2 5 13 -1.3
LEWIS 5 3 4 12 83.8
NUCLICKS 6 1 5 12 16.3
HIVELD 5 3 3 11 94.1
REUNERT 5 2 4 11 58.6
ASTRAL 5 2 4 11 55.4
ILLOVO 5 2 4 11 40.9
CAXTON 4 2 5 11 36.1
ALTECH 5 2 4 11 35.4
TRENCOR 5 1 4 10 44.1
SUPRGRP 4 1 5 10 34.6
AFROX 5 1 4 10 22.4
NAMPAK 5 2 3 10 14.0
MRPRICE 4 2 3 9 67.9
ELLERINE 5 0 4 9 37.3
ASPEN 4 1 3 8 68.2
PRIMEDIA 4 1 3 8 59.2
GOLDREEF 4 1 3 8 55.6
RAINBOW 4 1 3 8 44.4
GRINDROD 4 0 3 7 105.2
JDGROUP 3 2 2 7 32.2
DATATEC 3 1 2 6 96.7
FOSCHINI 3 1 2 6 76.2
MEDCLIN 3 1 2 6 40.8
DIDATA 3 1 2 6 19.1
JOHNCOM 3 0 2 5 64.7
SHOPRIT 2 2 1 5 58.7
TONGAAT 3 0 2 5 49.9
AVENG 2 2 1 5 41.6
MASSMART 3 0 2 5 32.5
MVELAGRP 3 0 2 5 5.3
TRUWTHS 2 1 1 4 44.7
SPAR 2 1 1 4 17.6
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No clear trends in the data are visible from the sorting arrangement applied in Table 8.
For example, the arithmetic mean growth rate for 2003 - 2006 for the group of companies
that made 14 relevant choices each is 46,8%.  For the group that made 10 choices each,
the arithmetic mean is 28,8%, and for those with 6 choices the mean is 58,2%.  Similarly,
the highest growth rate is recorded by Grindrod (105% mean annual growth), with 7
relevant choices, and the lowest by A-V-I (negative 1% growth) with 13 choices.  These
results and related issues are discussed in the next section.
In addition to the total available choices in each category, Table 9 indicates the mean,
kurtosis and skewness of the accounting choice data contained in Table 8.
 Table 9: Accounting choices by category: mean, kurtosis and skewness
Total available
choices
Mean number of
choices made
Kurtosis Skewness
Profit-increasing choices 10 4,3 -0,94 -0,02
Income-smoothing choices 4 1,4 -0,61 0,04
Solvency-improving choices 9 3,3 -1,10 -0,04
Total choices 23 9,0 -1,30 0,001
  Choices that achieve multiple strategies are counted multiple times.1
It is noticeable from the relatively low mean numbers of choices made in each category
that the general levels of apparent enthusiasm of company managers for adopting profit-
increasing, income-smoothing or solvency-improving accounting strategies appear to be
somewhat muted.  The companies are taking, on average, only 43% of the total available
profit-increasing options, 35% of the income-smoothing options and 37% of the
solvency-improving options.  Even allowing for the existence of trade-offs in accounting
choices made (such as between profitability and income volatility), these results are
somewhat unexpected.  The matter is further analysed and discussed in the next section.
The negative kurtoses in Table 9, at approximately -1 in each category, indicate relatively
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tailless, semicircular distributions for all accounting choice data categories.  This
represents a technical violation of the normal distribution assumption for the correlation
calculations carried out in the next section.  However, its significance is not considered
to be sufficient to invalidate the general findings, or to require the logarithmic or other
transformation of the data.  The low skewness measures (approximately 0 in each case)
indicate that the data distributions are symmetrical about the mean, and are therefore not
problematic.
The kurtosis of the mean annual growth rate data (not shown in Table 9) is low enough
(-0,17) to indicate a normal distribution, and although this data set is skewed to the right
(positive skewness of 0,37, with the mean at 47,6% greater than the median at 44,1%),
the technical failure of the symmetry assumption is also not considered to be sufficiently
substantive to invalidate the findings or to require data transformation.  
4.6 Analysis and discussion
All four hypotheses of this thesis are tested using Pearson product-moment correlation
analysis, carried out with the original (untransformed) data.  Table 10 below (last row)
reports the relevant correlations in this regard: between the mean annual growth rates for
the companies (“Growth rate”) and the number of profit-increasing accounting choices
(“Profit”), income-smoothing choices (“Smoothing”), solvency-improving choices
(“Solvency”) and the total number of choices (“Total”).  
The other rows of Table 10 report the correlations between the number of choices made
in each category.  The high correlations between the profit-increasing, solvency-
improving and total choices are of little interest.  However, the lower correlations
between the income-smoothing choices on the one hand, and the profit-increasing and
solvency-improving choices on the other, serve to illustrate and confirm the expected
trade-off between these accounting choice categories.  This matter is discussed further
below.
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Table 10: Correlation matrix
Profit Smoothing Solvency Total Growth rate
Profit 1,00
Smoothing 0,42 1,00
Solvency 0,93 0,37 1,00
Total 0,96 0,62 0,94 1,00
Growth rate -0,013 0,029 -0,060 -0,024 1,00
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between the number of profit-increasing
accounting choices made by companies and the growth rate in the share prices of
companies.  The very low correlation (-0,013) between Growth rate and Profit in
Table 10 provides no support for this prediction.  Similarly low correlations between
Growth rate and Smoothing, Solvency and Total also provide no support for Hypothesis
2 (a positive relationship between the number of income-smoothing choices and share
price growth rates), Hypothesis 3 (referring to solvency-improving choices) or Hypothesis
4 (total number of choices).  (In light of the very low absolute values of all four of the
correlations related to the hypothesis tests, the negative sign of three of them has no
separate or additional significance.)
This lack of correlation may be due to the research design rather than the theory.  In other
words, before a final conclusion can be reached that, contrary to the expectations arising
from the theory discussed in Chapter 2, there is no link between the number of profit-
increasing, income-smoothing or solvency-improving choices made by a company’s
management and the company’s share price, possible limitations arising from the
specification of the hypotheses should be considered.  One major concern is the fact that
it is a simplistic count of accounting choices that is used as a variable in each case, rather
than a proportionate measure based on, for example, the monetary amount of the effect
of a given choice expressed as a percentage of the company’s assets, profit or market
capitalisation.
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The research design of this thesis is based on the extraction of data from IFRS-compliant
annual reports, which (in the context of the requirements of this research) provide only
limited relevant information.  Any attempt to establish the monetary effects of the
alternative accounting choices from these sources would inevitably meet with only mixed
success.  It would, for example, be very easy to determine the amounts involved if a
company capitalised its borrowing costs rather than treating them as a period expense.
In contrast, it would be impossible (from annual reports alone) to quantify the monetary
effect of depreciating each category of property, plant and equipment at the mean
depreciation rate for all South African mid cap companies rather than at the actual rate
for that company.
Possible responses to this particular limitation could include requests addressed to the
companies for the provision of the required (private) information, or in the event that
such approaches meet with no success, an attempt to set some kind of normative
weightings to the choices, perhaps based on perceptions of the relative importance or
potential effectiveness of each choice.  Either or both of these possibilities may indicate
a fruitful direction for future research.
Another limitation in the research design arises from the use of year-end share prices to
determine the growth rates in share prices.  While such information is relatively easily
obtained from published stock exchange investors’ handbooks, such prices are probably
not representative of average share prices over the preceding year.  The attempt, in this
thesis, to reduce the effect of this inconvenient reality by using a three-year interval of
like-for-like comparisons may not have been adequate.  Future research could address
this deficiency by making more accurate calculations of share price growth rates.
It is implicit in the research methodology that each category of accounting choice is
assumed to have an approximately equivalent effect on share prices.  This means that, for
example, profit-increasing strategies are assumed to have as powerful an influence on
share price growth as solvency-improving strategies.  In addition, the trade-off effect, in
terms of which a profit-reducing or solvency-worsening choice may considered to be
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acceptable (or even desirable) by managers because it has an income-smoothing effect,
is not taken into account in the research design.  Further research could attempt to
quantify (or at least rank) the relative effects of the accounting choice categories, as well
as disentangle the trade-off effect.
Finally, further research could take into account such matters as the dividend payment
histories of the companies (in addition to share price movements, to determine total
return data); accounting policy and estimate disclosures in the annual reports of the
companies for all years in the review period (to determine what changes in accounting
choices have occurred, which will address the limitation referred to in 4.4.5); and
differences in the economic circumstances affecting different JSE sectors (to determine
the extent to which changes in economic conditions are obscuring the effects of
accounting choices).
The lack of correlation between share price growth rates and the number of profit-
increasing, income-smoothing and solvency-improving accounting choices may also be
due to inadequacies in the theory, rather than (or as well as) limitations in the research
design.  There may be “a selection bias in the literature [from which the theory is derived]
in that findings which support the existence of a connection between the variables [such
as share price growth rates] and the accounting choices may be seen as more interesting,
and more publishable, than research which does not find such a connection” (Arnold,
1994: 876).  Similarly, Lambert and Sponem (2005: 726) suggest that “despite the
popular wisdom that earnings management exists, it has been remarkably difficult for
researchers to convincingly document it”.
The main potential inadequacy in the theory appears to be the emphasis placed on the
apparent importance of accounting choices, whilst ignoring or downplaying the relevance
of other kinds of decisions that opportunistic managers may make.  For example,
managers may perceive that self-serving decisions made on an operating, financing or
tax-effect basis (without regard to the accounting consequences) are far more relevant to
their personal utility than the manipulation of  relatively obscure accounting numbers
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reported in documents to which little attention is paid by investors.  
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter describes the company selection criteria applied in this thesis, and the
methods used to collect the relevant accounting choice and share price data.  The chapter
then presents an analysis of the data in order to establish the extent to which support
exists for the profit-increasing, income-smoothing , solvency-improving and total choice
hypotheses of this thesis.  Finally, the results of the analyses are discussed, in the context
of limitations of the research design and possible directions for any future research effort
in this field.
The next, and final, chapter of this thesis concludes the study with a summary of its aims,
findings and implications.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to establish whether there is a positive relationship between the profit-
increasing, income-smoothing and solvency-improving accounting choices made by the
managers of South African listed mid cap companies and growth rates in the share prices
of those companies.
The expectation of such a relationship arises from agency theory, in terms of which it is
argued that company managers will, in the presence of appropriate compensation-based
motivation, select those accounting policies and make those accounting estimates that
have the highest likelihood of maximising their utility through increases in share price.
The plausibility of such a relationship arises from the availability of a number of
accounting choices, within the accepted set of accounting rules, that have the ability to
affect reported accounting numbers.  In addition, it is rational for managers to expect that
accounting choices are significant, because of the possibility of the existence of some
equity market inefficiency.  Finally, prior empirical research provides evidence of
positive relationships between profit-increasing, income-smoothing and solvency-
improving strategies and share prices.
In this thesis, thirty-nine mid cap companies are analysed for evidence of the expected
relationship between accounting choices and share price growth.  The research
methodology applied finds no evidence for the hypotheses that the managers of South
African listed companies make profit-increasing, income-smoothing or solvency-
improving accounting choices in order to influence growth rates in share prices.  This
may be due to limitations in the research design, inadequacies in the theory, or a
combination of both.  Refinements in the research design or a re-interpretation of the
theory may be successful in addressing these matters as part of future research efforts.
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APPENDIX A:  THE INCLUDED COMPANIES BY JSE SECTOR
General retailers Chemicals 
Ellerine Holdings Ltd AECI Ltd
Foschini Ltd African Oxygen Ltd
JD Group Ltd
Lewis Group Ltd Electronic & electrical equipment
Massmart Holdings Ltd Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd
New Clicks Holdings Ltd Reunert Ltd
Mr Price Group Ltd
Truworths International Ltd Software & computer services
Datatec Ltd
Food producers Dimension Data Holdings Plc
Astral Foods Ltd
AVI Ltd Travel & leisure
Illovo Sugar Ltd Gold Reef Resorts Ltd
Rainbow Chicken Ltd Sun International Ltd
Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd
General industrial
Construction & materials Nampak Ltd
Aveng Ltd
Group Five Ltd Health care equipment & services
W ilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Ltd Medi-Clinic Corporation Ltd
Food & drug retailers Industrial metals
Pick ‘n Pay Stores Ltd Highveld Steel And Vanadium Corporation Ltd
Shoprite Holdings Ltd
The Spar Group Ltd Mobile telecommunications
Allied Technologies Ltd
Industrial transportation
Grindrod Ltd Pharmaceuticals
Super Group Ltd Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd
Trencor Ltd
Support services
Media Mvelaphanda Group Ltd
Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Ltd
Johnnic Communications Ltd
Primedia Ltd
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APPENDIX B: DEPRECIATION RATES
Buildings Plant Computers Vehicles Number of
biased
estimates
High bias
for PPE
useful life
AECI NS NS NS NS 4 Y
AFROX 2.5 6.7 33.3 15 3 Y
ALTRON 3.5 19.2 31.3 18.8 1 N
ALTECH 3.5 19.2 26.7 25 0 N
ASPEN 6.4 51.7 55 NA 0 N
ASTRAL 4.5 13 15 15 3 Y
AVENG 2 25 21.5 25 2 N
A-V-I 2.3 15 21.7 22.9 3 Y
CAXTON 2 8.3 24 20 4 Y
DATATEC 5 NA 33.5 37.5 0 N
DIDATA 2 NA 23.5 25 2 N
ELLERINE 3.1 NA 41.5 20 2 N
FOSCHINI 5 NA 26.5 22.5 0 N
GOLDREEF 2 13.4 33.4 20 3 Y
GRINDROD NA 12.5 26.7 21.7 1 N
GROUP 5 2 13.4 33.3 20 3 Y
HIVELD 3.5 26 28.3 28.3 0 N
ILLOVO NS NS NS NS 4 Y
JDGROUP 4.3 17.5 25 16.3 2 N
JOHNCOM 4.4 19.2 19.2 26.7 1 N
LEWIS 2 NA 21.7 22.5 2 N
MASSMART 2 18.8 22.9 18.8 3 Y
MEDCLIN 1.5 NA 15 17 3 Y
MRPRICE NA NA 29.2 17 1 N
MVELAGRP NA 17.5 33.3 22.5 0 N
NAMPAK 6 27.5 17.5 30 1 N
NUCLICKS 2 NA 23.5 20 4 Y
PICKNPAY 2.5 NA 32 15 2 N
PRIMEDIA 2 15 20.8 22.5 3 Y
RAINBOW 3 6.7 NS 22.9 3 Y
REUNERT 5.3 11.7 21.7 20.9 3 Y
SHOPRIT 5 15 33.3 15 2 N
SUNINT 4.5 7 16 17.5 3 Y
SUPRGRP 2 17.5 33.3 17.5 2 N
SPAR NA 20.8 21.7 17.5 2 N
TONGAAT 2.7 13.8 21.7 16.7 4 Y
TRENCOR 2 11.1 21.7 22.5 3 Y
TRUWTHS 5.5 NA 20 NS 2 N
WBHO 2 NS 21.7 NS 4 Y
Mean 3.3 17 26.3 21 2.18
  All amounts are percentages.     
  NA:  Asset class not held by company.
  NS:  Not stated in annual report.
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APPENDIX C: ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS
Discount rate Expected rate
of return
Expected
inflation rate
Number of
biased
estimates
Bias in actuarial
assumptions
AECI 8.6 8.6 4.8 1 N
AFROX 9 9.5 5.8 3 Y
ALTRON 7.5 9 4.5 2 Y
ALTECH 7.5 9 4.5 2 Y
ASPEN 7.5 6.25 5.5 1 N
ASTRAL 8.5 NS 5.5 2 Y
AVENG 8.5 8.5 5.5 1 N
A-V-I 8 NA 6 0 N
CAXTON NA NA NA 0 N
DATATEC NA NA NA 0 N
DIDATA NA NA NA 0 N
ELLERINE NS NS NS 3 Y
FOSCHINI NS NS NS 3 Y
GOLDREEF NA NA NA 0 N
GRINDROD 9.6 NA 6.2 1 N
GROUP 5 9.5 9.5 6.8 2 Y
HIVELD 8.6 NA 6.5 0 N
ILLOVO 8.3 8.3 4.5 1 N
JDGROUP 8.5 7.5 4.5 1 N
JOHNCOM 8 NA 6.5 0 N
LEWIS 7.5 9 4.5 2 Y
MASSMART NS NS NS 3 Y
MEDCLIN 7.5 NA 5.5 1 N
MRPRICE 7.5 8.5 5.5 1 N
MVELAGRP NA NA NA 0 N
NAMPAK 9.5 10 5.5 3 Y
NUCLICKS 8 NA 6 0 N
PICKNPAY 10 10 7 2 Y
PRIMEDIA 8 8.5 6 0 N
RAINBOW 15 15 13.5 2 Y
REUNERT 9 10 5.8 3 Y
SHOPRIT 7.5 NA 6.5 0 N
SUNINT 8.5 8.3 5 1 N
SUPRGRP NA NA NA 0 N
SPAR 8.5 NA 5.5 1 N
TONGAAT 8 8 4.8 1 N
TRENCOR NS NS NS 3 Y
TRUWTHS 8.5 8 6.5 0 N
WBHO 9 6 5.8 2 Y
Mean 8.6 8.9 5.9 1.23
  All amounts are percentages.     
  NA:  Company does not have a defined benefit plan.
  NS:  Not stated in annual report.
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APPENDIX D: ESTIMATES USED IN IMPAIRMENT TESTS
Discount rate Growth rate Number of
biased
estimates
Bias in
impairment
tests
AECI NS NS 2 Y
AFROX 19 19 1 N
ALTRON NS NS 2 Y
ALTECH NS NS 2 Y
ASPEN NS NS 2 Y
ASTRAL 13 5 1 N
AVENG 15 5 0 N
A-V-I NS NS 2 Y
CAXTON NS NS 2 Y
DATATEC NS NS 2 Y
DIDATA 12.6 15 2 Y
ELLERINE 12 12.5 2 Y
FOSCHINI NS NS 2 Y
GOLDREEF 9.6 30.2 2 Y
GRINDROD 11 NS 2 Y
GROUP 5 NS NS 2 Y
HIVELD NS NS 2 Y
ILLOVO NS NS 2 Y
JDGROUP 17.3 NS 1 N
JOHNCOM NS NS 2 Y
LEWIS NS NS 2 Y
MASSMART 14 3 0 N
MEDCLIN NS NS 2 Y
MRPRICE NS NS 2 Y
MVELAGRP NS NS 2 Y
NAMPAK 12.1 0 1 N
NUCLICKS NS NS 2 Y
PICKNPAY NS NS 2 Y
PRIMEDIA 11.4 3 1 N
RAINBOW 12.4 5 1 N
REUNERT 20.2 15 1 N
SHOPRIT 17.1 4.1 0 N
SUNINT NS NS 2 Y
SUPRGRP NS NS 2 Y
SPAR 10.5 5.5 1 N
TONGAAT NS NS 2 Y
TRENCOR NS NS 2 Y
TRUWTHS 16.6 NS 0 N
WBHO 14.5 NS 0 N
Mean 14 9.4 1.54
  All amounts are percentages.     
  NS:  Not stated in annual report.
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APPENDIX E: ANNUAL REPORT DATA COLLECTION FORM
[Explanations added where necessary, in italics.]
                      [Company name]                             Ltd     [Year end: DD / MM]     2006
REF ISSUE COMMENT
- Auditor / audit report [Name of auditor; was the audit report
unqualified?]
- Total assets [In R million per 2006 balance sheet]
- Profit for the year [In R million per 2006 income statement]
- Performance bonus for directors [Does the company have a cash- or share-based
bonus plan for its executive directors?]
IAS16 Cost or revaluation model for PPE
IAS16 Depreciation methods and rates [Methods and rates recorded for each of the
following four PPE categories, where applicable:
buildings, plant, computers and vehicles.]
IAS19 Actuarial gains and losses [How are these accounted for? (Eg direct to equity,
10% corridor method, or immediately in the
income statement.)]
IAS19 Actuarial assumptions for defined
benefit accounting
[The following actuarial assumptions recorded,
where applicable: discount rate, expected return on
plan assets and expected inflation rate.] 
IAS23 Borrowing costs [Capitalised or recognised as an expense?]
IAS36 Discount and growth rates for
impairment testing
IAS37 Reversal of unused provisions [Were any unused provisions (sufficiently material
to require separate disclosure) reversed in the
2006 annual report?]
IAS38 Indefinite useful life intangible
assets
[Has the company designated any of its intangible
assets as having an indefinite useful life?]
IAS39 Investments designated as
available for sale
[Has the company designated any of its financial
assets as available for sale?]
IAS40 Cost or fair value model for
investment property
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